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Introduction: Moral 
Development Study in 
the 21st Century 
Carolyn Pope Edwards 
and Gustavo Carlo 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Questions of right and wrong, good and bad, lawful and unlaw-
ful, have been debated by philosophers, theologians, scholars, and 
ordinary people since ancient times. The moral domain represents 
humanity's answers to three questions: What is the right thing to do? 
How is the best state of affairs achieved? What qualities make for a 
good person? However, the scientific investigation of the moral life 
has a much shorter intellectual history than does philosophical and 
religious reflection; nevertheless, it is not new. Moral development 
theory and research emerged as a critical topic over 100 years ago, at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, given this deep background, 
it may surprise readers to learn that this is the very first time that 
the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation has served as a forum to 
reflect on what we know about moral development and motivation 
and to integrate theory and research with practical implications for 
schools, communities, and childrearing. This book presents the prod-
ucts of the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: "Moral Devel-
opment through the Life Span: Theory, Research, and Applications." 
The symposium was held in Lincoln, Nebraska, in April 2003. 
Interest in moral development and motivation has been promi-
nent in the field of psychology since Sigmund Freud's theory about 
the Oedipus complex and the formation of the superego. Indeed, dur-
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MORAL MOTIVATION THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN 
ing certain earlier decades, especially the 1970s and 1980s, moral de-
velopment was a hot and contentious topic among social and 
behavioral scientists. Various proponents of behavioral versus struc-
tural theories, such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Jacob Gewirtz, en-
joyed squaring off in public and professional debates. Some impor-
tant books, such as Lickona (1976), Kurtines and Gewirtz (1984), and 
Eisenberg, Reykowski, and Staub (1989), grew out of those debates, 
and, even today, these sources are useful for reading clear statements 
of the alternative theoretical perspectives, which are presented as 
competing approaches to the study and interpretation of moral de-
velopment. However, following that lively but contentious period, 
the 1990s represented a quieter time of solid and steady gains in 
research study of moral development and prosodal behavior as well 
as a period of serious attempts at theoretical reconciliation and bridge 
building. 
This volume presents some of the most significant fruits of that 
labor by distinguished and well-known researchers in the field. It is 
intended to summarize what we now know about moral motivation 
theory, research, and application across the life span. Although not all 
major theoretical or empirical traditions are covered here, the authors 
represent diverse theoretical orientations and methodologies that ad-
dress many of the important issues in moral motivation. Various 
themes run throughout the chapters, and each chapter summarizes 
work that adds to our existing knowledge regarding moral develop-
ment. 
The Historical Background to Current Research 
To understand our existing scientific knowledge of moral motiva-
tion, it is necessary first to consider some aspects of the historical, 
cultural, and contextual underpinnings of the major research going 
on in this field today. There is now a long and storied tradition of 
scholarly advances in the study of moral development. The first large 
systematic study of children's cheating, lying, obedience, and other 
"good" behavior was conducted by Hartshorne, May, and Shuttle-
worth (1930). James Mark Baldwin (1897), a developmental psychol-
ogist, and John Dewey (1930), a philosopher and educator, were two 
other Americans who did important foundational writing about the 
ways in which moral thinking unfolds in childhood, but they did not 
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test or document their theories with empirical research. Jean Pia get 
in Geneva, Switzerland, drew partly on the work of Baldwin when 
he invented new and productive ways to observe and interview chil-
dren and then construct a framework with which to understand chil-
dren's conceptions of games, rules, punishment, and justice and fair-
ness (Piaget, 1932/1977). 
Schooled in these early theoretical speculations and bodies of 
findings as well as in the sociological theories of George Herbert 
Mead (1967) and Emile Durkheim (1979), Lawrence Kohlberg initi-
ated the contemporary era of systematic empirical research when, in 
the 1960s, he formulated his "cognitive-developmental" stage the-
ory of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg, Levine, & 
Hewer, 1983) in the form of strong claims and invited the field to en-
gage in dialogue on the basis of argument and empirical evidence. At 
Harvard University, Kohlberg worked with a series of colleagues and 
students who went on to refine, elaborate, or critique and revise his 
theory in major ways, extending its reach into such areas as domain 
theory and social conventions (Turiel, 1983), social perspective taking 
(Selman, 1980), ego development (Kegan, 1982), distributive justice 
concepts (Damon, 1977), sociomoral reflection (Gibbs, Basinger, & 
Fuller, 1992), women's "way of knowing" (Belenky, 1986; Gilligan, 
1982), and cross-cultural studies (Edwards, 1979, 1985; Snarey, 1985). 
Methodological issues (measurement, reliability, validity) were cen-
tral, and Ann Colby and Kohlberg (1987) published a manual to aid 
systematic methods of coding and scoring moral judgment inter-
views. James Rest at the University of Minnesota established a center 
devoted to research on moral development using a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development (the 
Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979; for more discussion, see Narvaez, 
in this volume). Kohlberg was always deeply committed to making 
positive changes in human life and society and, with such colleagues 
as Clark Power and Ann Higgins (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989), 
innovated methods of stimulating the development of moral reason-
ing and attitudes in school and prison settings. 
Meanwhile, the theory aroused passionate debate and criticism 
(e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Kurtines & Grief, 1974). Not only were more be-
haviorally oriented psychologists eager to establish alternative meth-
ods for systematically studying prosocial values and behavior (see, 
e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; Staub, 1978), but also educators moved 
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quickly to establish alternative ways of promoting "character edu-
cation" in schools as a way of fostering the development and prac-
ticing of attitudes and behaviors creating respect for others, caring 
attitudes, empathy, and appropriate cooperation with authority (see 
also Noddings, 1984). Many of these programs have thrived and be-
come influential models (e.g., Battistisch, Watson, Solomon, Schaps, 
& Solomon, 1991). Thus, the controversies stimulated a rising and 
vital field of study and helped set the agenda (pro and con) for much 
of the ensuing research and practice regarding moral development 
and education. 
Since Kohlberg's death in 1987, moreover, the field of moral de-
velopment and education has continued to evolve and change. Its 
theoretical foundations have undergone important transformations, 
perhaps as the almost inevitable consequence of over 4 decades of ac-
cumulating empirical study as well as the sustained, extensive schol-
arly debate. In this volume, we present the views of six noted schol-
ars concerning the most important recent findings. Our contributors 
synthesize work that has had, or is expected to have, a significant 
impact on moral development theory, research, and application. 
The varied research traditions in moral development and moti-
vation are linked to crucial differences in underlying meta theoretical 
assumptions. These philosophical and scientific assumptions are in-
herent to their perspectives, and they affect how each scholar both 
interprets observed moral phenomena and selects his or her research 
methods. In simplified terms, the issues can be considered by ad-
dressing a series of critical questions. (1) What motivates moral think-
ing and behavior? While emotions, intellect, and values may all be 
part of the story, what is most important for the researcher to study 
and describe? (2) Are objective standards or validating criteria (such 
as religious commandants or approval by society) necessary to judge 
and justify a person's actions? Or, instead, are matters of right and 
wrong (good and bad) dependent on human beings' subjective choices, 
which cannot be externally validated? (3) Are any moral rules or 
principles universal to all times and places, in the sense that they 
ought to be recognized by all human societies, or are moral issues 
necessarily specific and relative to cultural and historical contexts 
and circumstances? (4) What is the nature of human beings who make 
choices and engage in moral or immoral actions? Are they active and 
autonomous moral agents or, instead, passive persons whose behav-
Xlll 
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ior is (fully) explained by processes of socialization/social influence 
or by unconscious emotions beyond individual control? (5) What is 
the place of spirituality or faith in moral development as well as in 
research? Can nonrational processes like the spiritual dimension of 
moral decisionmaking be investigated by moral researchers? Does 
spiritual development have a legitimate place in public school or com-
munity service programs that seek to promote moral development? 
(6) What scientific methodologies should be employed and what kinds 
of evidence brought forward to study moral motivation and develop-
ment? Should affective or cognitive processes be the focus of attention? 
What kind of evidence about actions, or observed behaviors, is required 
to substantiate a research program? (7) Finally, what is the relation 
between moral development research and childrearing and education? 
That is, what can (and should) be fostered through processes of so-
cialization or programs of therapy, reconciliation, and education? Are 
such efforts primarily intended to foster changes in people's ideas 
and expertise in rational decisionmaking, or, instead, are they directed 
toward creating changes in people's emotions, feeling capacities, and 
sphere of concern? 
Because the philosophical, scientific, and educational issues that 
lie behind and drive each scholar's program of research make for 
interesting contrasts, we provide a preview of the volume and its 
dominant themes by considering what the authors have to say about 
each of these key questions. Readers will, we believe, find that the 
chapters provide stimulating and provocative reflections on some 
of the most important and timely issues of our day. The authors 
represent some of the sophisticated and up-to-date theories, research, 
and applications in knowledge about moral development across the 
life span. 
What Motivates Morality? 
Moral behavior is intentional behavior, but what motivates it? Kagan 
describes two essential motives as the foundation of moral behavior: 
first, an emotional motivation to gain sensory pleasure (and avoid 
pain); second, a cognitive motivation to confirm that one's behaviors, 
thoughts, or feelings are in accord with one's concepts or representa-
tions of what is good. Eisenberg f~)Cuses on the influence of empathy-
related responding in motivating behavior. Although the primary 
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focus of her research in graduate school was moral reasoning, over 
time she became convinced that affective responses (empathy, sym-
pathy, and personal distress) are as important as or more important 
than rationality (moral reasoning) in predicting both pro social and 
antisocial behavior. Power and Narvaez seem to agree that moral 
motivation is an explicit yearning or desire to be good (virtuous, righ-
teous) and to do good for self and others. Narvaez describes four pro-
cesses fundamental to a moral orientation: moral sensitivity; judg-
ment; motivation; and action. Power's model delineates cognitive, 
environmental, and spiritual conditions or experiences that push in-
dividuals to seek the good. Hart, a personality theorist, is interested 
in moral identity as a source of motivation. Identity is composed of 
experiences related to self-awareness, continuity through time and 
place, the self in relation to others, and the self as the basis for strong 
evaluations. It includes the important plans, goals, and values that 
form a basis for the individual's perceiving, judging, and acting. Hart 
acknowledges that personality attributes influence moral responses 
but reminds us of the social forces (community conditions) that can 
facilitate or mitigate those behaviors. 
Finally, Staub provides the most elaborated discussion of moral 
motivations. He emphasizes a core set of basic human needs, such 
as needs for nurturance, affection, and guidance in childhood. Emo-
tional deprivation and difficult and challenging environments usu-
ally frustrate the individual and lead to negative emotions, such as 
anger, envy, hostility, and aggression. Staub lays out a typology of 
moral motivations: (1) beliefs or principles, such as enlightened self-
interest, the golden rule, or the sanctity of life; (2) altruism, which 
arises out of empathy, sympathy, compassion, and, occasionally, suf-
fering; and (3) pro social value orientation, which refers to a positive 
view of humans and a sense of responsibility for others' welfare. 
"Inclusive caring" (as opposed to in-group caring), moral courage, 
and positive bystandership are forms of moral motivation especially 
important to Staub. 
Is Morality Objective or Subjective? 
All researchers on moral development make some assumptions re-
garding the objectivity versus subjectivity of basic moral principles. 
Certainly, ethicists have debated questions about the truth basis of 
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morality and ethical decisionmaking for thousands of years without 
coming to a consensus. Scientists, too, make different judgments, 
having responded in contrasting ways to the complex issues in-
volved. On the one hand, as moral researchers, they participate in 
the Western community of science, which inherits an ancient intel-
lectuallegacy of notions about truth seeking that is rooted in Greek 
philosophy, for instance, Platonic notions about moral "ideals" that 
can be and should be rediscovered by the rational mind. The Platonic 
tradition has endured in the influential works of philosophers such 
as Immanuel Kant (1785/1993) and, more recently, John Rawls (1971, 
2001). Along that same line, most moral researchers are descendants 
of cultural-religious traditions that affirm some objective and uni-
versal basis to certain moral principles, all the major world religions 
(Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism) recognizing basic ethical 
laws or moral commandments. 
On the other hand, contemporary moral researchers undergo 
training that immerses them in psychological concepts of conscious-
ness and the self. They are exposed to developmental theories con-
cerning childhood socialization and enculturation along with social-
psychological theories about interpersonal influence that heighten 
recognition of the conscious and unconscious sources of individual 
decisionmaking and the influence of context. Along this same line, 
moral researchers as social scientists learn to appreciate the difficulty 
of choosing one single" correct" overarching theory that explains all 
aspects of human development, and they are trained in descriptive 
and predictive statistical analytic techniques based on probabilis-
tic determinism. All these influences incline researchers to question 
whether moral decisionmaking can be truly objective. 
Perhaps as a result of their scientific training, many moral devel-
opmental psychologists currently take the view that moral phenom-
ena are interpreted and processed in unique ways by each individual, 
as stated by Narvaez in her chapter. For example, both Kagan and 
Staub devote major portions of their chapters to summarizing what 
they see as the most important and general cognitive mechanisms 
and developmental processes that can help account for the incredibly 
wide range of human moral choices and phenomena. Kagan sug-
gests that there is a "good" to which human beings aspire, and he 
identifies a developmental cascade of processes that help account for 
individual and group differences in moral actions, yet he explicitly 
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rejects an objective basis to morality. At the Nebraska symposium, he 
sparked lively debate when he declared that there is no objective way 
to call immoral even the acts of people (e.g., terrorists) who destroy 
others in the service of moral ideals. While Staub also focuses on 
the life-cycle events that tend to promote the development of moral 
conscience and prosocial behavior, he differs from Kagan in believing 
that underlying the diversity of human judgments about morality is 
the basic perception that moral action is about not doing harm or 
injury to the self or others. Therefore, Staub comes closer than does 
Kagan to affirming an objective notion of morality. 
Eisenberg emphasizes subjectivism when she describes how pro-
cesses such as empathy-related responding, affectivity, and affect 
regulation powerfully motivate prosodal and discourage antisocial 
actions. She defines prosocial behavior as voluntary behavior intended 
to benefit another person and altruistic behavior as prosodal behavior 
primarily motivated by other-oriented, moral values and emotions 
rather than egoistic or pragmatic concerns. In other words, she as-
serts that pro social behaviors might have many different motives 
but that altruistic behaviors have a much more specific underlying 
motive. 
Hart takes a pragmatic approach and focuses on the intraper-
sonal and environmental influences of moral character development. 
Hart applies the notion of moral luck, which refers to the positive 
opportunities available in certain kinds of environments, to his con-
ception of morality. He suggests that moral behaviors are contingent 
on social circumstances and opportunities as much as on personal 
qualities. Thus, the moral qualities of individuals can be fostered or 
hampered by experiences and opportunities in their environment. 
In contrast to the others, Power takes the position closest to ob-
jectivism by holding to the central Kohlbergian insight that a sense of 
justice as fairness does, and should, underlie mature and principled 
moral reasoning. Narvaez, also a cognitive-develop mentalist in the 
James Rest tradition, has moved away from Kohlbergian notions of 
principled moral reasoning to the extent of viewing mature moral 
reasoning as the product of "expertise." The objectivist orientations 
that are reflected in Staub's, Power's, and Narvaez's perspectives 
provide some contrast to the subjectivist orientations that are re-
flected in Eisenberg's, Hart's, and Kagan's perspectives. 
Are Moral Truths Universal? 
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The tension between objective and subjective moral ideals becomes 
especially apparent when moral scholars debate the universal versus 
relative nature of moral values and judgments (e.g., Wong, 1984). In 
the present volume, most of the authors present paradigms that op-
pose extreme cultural relativism. Kagan is the exception. He argues 
that cultures with integrity have promoted very different a priori 
moral standards as moral ideals and that no one can be considered 
altruistic or prosocial without specifying the agent, the target, and 
the context of the action. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether there are any cultural uni-
versals in the content of morality, all six contributors argue for some 
universal elements of moral motivation or moral development. Ka-
gan posits a universal developmental sequence for the separate com-
ponents of morality: an initial concept of prohibited acts; an ability 
to infer the thoughts of another; the acquisition of the value of the 
semantic concepts good and bad; the ability to relate past to present; 
and a recognition of social identity categories to which self belongs. 
Likewise, Staub, Eisenberg, Narvaez, and Hart claim that there are 
general cognitive mechanisms and emotional processes that underlie 
moral development around the world. 
Power goes farther and suggests that these universal formal pro-
cesses imply a culturally universal basis to the content of the human 
recognition of the good. For example, Power argues that desire for 
good is tied closely to a desire for truth, justice, and happiness, and 
he attempts to describe "the categorical, universal, and prescriptive 
features of the moral domain" (p. 199). Furthermore, Power notes the 
lack of focus by most researchers on the spiritual aspects of morality, 
and he asserts that, at the highest stages of moral development, there 
is transcendent understanding and appreciation of human existence. 
It is important to note that the authors' perspectives on the gen-
erality of moral processes are not necessarily incompatible with other 
evidence on the culturally specific aspects of moral decisionmaking 
(Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Shweder, Maha-
patra, & Miller, 1987; Tietjen, 1986; Whiting & Edwards, 1988). For ex-
ample, Eisenberg notes that her research suggests that cross-cultural 
differences in prosocial traits (e.g., moral reasoning) exist. Narvaez 
agrees but notes that the use of the Defining Issues Test reveals larger 
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within-group than between-group differences, after controlling for 
age and education. Staub (1989, 2003), who studies genocide and 
works to promote reconciliation and healing, is especially interested 
in societal-level forces and historical conditions that incline whole 
groups of people to accept authoritarian regimes or commit mass 
harm to others (see also Moshman, 2004). 
One key to reconciling the different perspectives is to examine 
the multiple sources of between- and within-group variance and con-
sider both additive and interactive effects (Carlo, Roesch, Knight, & 
Koller, 2001). Acknowledging the additive and multiplicative influ-
ences of moral outcomes would reflect the multidimensional, real-
life complexity of individuals and enhance the ecological validity 
of moral development theories. Furthermore, beyond simply doc-
umenting individual differences, it is critical to understand them. 
Many or most aspects of normative moral thinking and behavior 
grow out of specific cultural contexts for which they may be generally 
adaptive (i.e., they allow people to function together in social settings, 
manage and control aggression, and negotiate individual striving; 
LeVine, 1994). For example, working in Kenya, Edwards (1979, 1985; 
Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981) documented that differences in 
the adult stage of moral reasoning among respected adults and el-
ders (as measured by Kohlberg's structural system) were closely re-
lated to the context of daily living: whether conflict resolution was 
situated within the close setting of a face-to-face community (rural 
village) or, instead, within the impersonal institutions of a complex 
society with competing elites. However, adaptation is not the whole 
story of moral functioning. Any set of normative values or cognitive 
schemata can quickly become maladaptive and reactionary in the face 
of disequilibrating forces (overpopulation, famine, war, disease) or 
rapid transformations of economy, education, and technology that 
outpace individual and group capacities to adapt smoothly. Without 
attention to the possible impact of historical and societal conditions, 
there is a danger of overestimating the homogeneity of moral devel-
opment in diverse social contexts. 
Are Human Beings Active Moral Agents? 
One of the common themes throughout the volume is the acknowl-
edgment of individuals as active moral agents who have the capac-
xix 
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ity to control their actions. Whereas some prior theories of moral 
conduct (e.g., radical behaviorist theories; Skinner, 1971) might have 
posited the individual as a relatively passive agent, most contem-
porary theories of moral motivation seem to adopt an interactionist 
perspective that acknowledges the individual as an active or au-
tonomous agent. Interestingly, however, each theory may differ in 
terms of the specific impact accorded the environment and the degree 
to which individuals can modify or select their environment. 
The chapters by Power and Narvaez provide examples of theo-
ries that emphasize the active role of the moral agent through cog-
nitive and social information processes. Individuals are posited to 
respond to moral situations on the basis of their own unique percep-
tions, which make their action choices dynamic and unpredictable. 
Both Hart and Power acknowledge the role of the "moral self" as 
an agent of morality-and, hence, self-concept development is an 
integral part of moral development. Hart places the self inside the 
community when he discusses "moral luck," or the socioeconomic 
community into which the child is born and how poverty and other 
adverse conditions can overwhelm a community's capacity to pro-
vide its young people with adequate opportunities for public service. 
Eisenberg and Kagan offer a somewhat different but compatible con-
ception of the active role of the moral agent via the individual's af-
fective tendencies. According to them, affectivity and affective regu-
lation processes influence both cognitive processes and moral action 
choices. Two central issues in their scheme are the degree to which 
individuals are aware of their influence and the degree to which those 
processes are under individuals' willful control. In a different but not 
necessarily incompatible perspective, Staub's chapter provides the 
most elaborate account of the interaction between agent and envi-
ronment. 
What Is the Role of Spirituality in Moral Development? 
Many theorists of moral development do not explicitly acknowledge 
the role of spirituality, but Power addresses this topic in depth. Power 
begins his chapter by referring to Kohlberg's (1973) proposed "stage 
7" (existential stage). The idea of moral development beyond stage 
6 was speculative (and, therefore, usually neglected in current text-
book descriptions of Kohlberg's moral stage theory). In his paper on 
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stage 7, Kohlberg hypothesized that the developing person may seek 
a kind of cosmic insight or understanding that goes beyond the ad-
vanced and principled understanding of justice and welfare encoded 
in the postconventional moral judgment stages. Although Kohlberg 
was tentative in his hypotheses, Power has picked up on the invita-
tion to speculate about cosmic or spiritual awareness as part of moral 
development. Power believes that individuals who have attained a 
sophisticated level of moral reasoning sometimes also thirst for a 
mystical and personal understanding of the relation between their 
moral self and the natural or supernatural universe. Their sense of 
transcendence and spiritualism can be a source of moral inspiration 
and motivation. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to 
support this notion, but Power provides compelling anecdotal de-
scriptions of how deep spiritual convictions and commitment in-
terplay with moral understanding and lead to moral actions and 
self-sacrifice (but see Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner, 1982). 
Furthermore, Hart studies young people nominated as "care exem-
plars," and he discusses findings that suggest that most of the ado-
lescents became involved in their moral commitments through social 
institutions such as churches, service agencies, and schools. Clearly, 
this is an area that deserves more attention from future researchers. 
What Methods Should Be Used to Investigate 
Moral Development? 
It is evident from our discussion of the various meta theoretical as-
sumptions that the experts contributing to this volume have em-
ployed different methodological techniques in their research. How-
ever, arguments about methodology did not dominate the discussion 
at the 51st Nebraska symposium. Perhaps this should not be surpris-
ing since debates that took place in the field 20 years ago about the 
superiority of different research strategies (e.g., clinical interview for-
mat, paper-and-pencil questionnaires, experimental observations of 
prosocial behavior, physiological measures of affective responding) 
have given way in recent years to a general acknowledgment of the 
potential benefits of using multiple methodologies. This transforma-
tion has yielded a rich pool of new information that promises to con-
verge to provide a complex and differentiated conceptualization of 
moral development. We are moving toward a more integrated under-
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standing that includes cognitive and emotional dimensions, micro 
and macro levels of analysis, and proximal and distal causal factors. 
Power and Narvaez, who emphasize cognitive-developmental 
and information-processing approaches, use a combination of tra-
ditional and innovative methodologies to assess the cognitive com-
ponents of moral development. Kagan, in contrast, is particularly 
interested in temperamentally based reactions to unfamiliar events 
and situations, and, therefore, he advocates longitudinal research on 
the interaction of physiological predisp9sitions (reactivity) and emo-
tional dispositions relevant to moral development (such as shame 
and guilt). Eisenberg provides a synopsis of her multimethod ap-
proach, which relies heavily on physiological markers, self-report 
and multiple-reporter measures, and observational techniques. In 
her chapter, she argues for the importance of carefully distinguishing 
different kinds of empathy-related responses and measuring them 
separately. Each affect-defined as empathy, sympathy, and personal 
distress-has different predictors and outcomes. For example, sympa-
thy is associated with enhanced prosocial responding toward needy 
or distressed individuals, whereas personal distress reactions some-
times are negatively related to helping and sharing. Similarly, Staub 
relies on research findings from various methodologies but extends 
his analysis by reflecting on case studies of individuals and societal-
level events. In contrast, Hart uses a case study approach and also 
borrows heavily from personality traditions in using large, archival 
data sets to examine the personality by situation interactions that 
predict moral functioning. 
How Are Theory and Research Linked to Applications? 
Questions regarding moral motivation become most significant 
when we begin to develop programs aimed at promoting and fos-
tering moral development. Each of the chapters offers insights into 
the various sources of moral motivation and implications for chil-
drearing or education. For example, Eisenberg's chapter indicates 
the heuristic value of distinguishing between several categories of 
empathy-related responses (empathy, sympathy, and personal dis-
tress) because each appears to be positioned differently along the 
pathways linking socializing events and long-term prosocial out-
comes. High levels of sympathy and empathy are linked to more 
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positive outcomes, whereas high levels of personal distress (e.g., dis-
comfort in the presence of someone needing help or comfort) tend 
to predict more negative outcomes such as low levels of pro social 
behavior (e.g., avoidance). Kagan's chapter likewise suggests the 
vulnerability of highly anxious people to uncomfortable levels of 
guilt and shame. Although not discussed at length in the present 
volume, programs designed to foster empathic responding or to reg-
ulate emotional responding have been the focus or part of many 
prevention and intervention programs (e.g., Battistisch et al., 1991). 
The chapters by Power, Narvaez, Hart, and Staub go farthest in 
elaborating links between theory, research, and application. Power 
identifies three social contexts for promoting moral development: 
schools; prisons; and sports. Based on Kohlberg's theory, the just-
community approach provided a rich source of innovation in moral 
education (Power et al., 1989). Power makes a persuasive argument 
that, although the just-community program was originally designed 
to foster moral judgment and reasoning through discussion and re-
flection, it actually affected behavior and motivation as well and in-
volved changes in the moral atmosphere of the school, prison, or 
community program toward becoming a democratic and respectful 
community. Power's reflection on the impact of those pioneering 
projects provides compelling evidence on the links between moral 
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. 
In recent years, Power has turned his attention to implementing 
moral development through sports activities and participation. Sim-
ilarly, Hart and his colleagues have developed a program designed 
to promote social responsibility and care through sports. The Sports 
Teaching About Responsibility and Respect (STARR) program is an 
exemplar of programs that can work under some of the most adverse 
social circumstances, given the unique potential of sports to attract 
and motivate young children and adolescents in situations where 
other approaches to character education may fail. These research-
based, systematic ventures into changing moral character through 
participation in team sports will undoubtedly become the subject of 
much discussion and analyses by future moral developmental schol-
ars. 
Narvaez provides the most in-depth discussion of the applica-
tion of moral education programs in schools. She summarizes in her 
chapter various techniques that practitioners, teachers, and profes-
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sionals (and parents) can use to promote moral development in chil-
dren. Based on a program developed for schools in Minnesota, Nar-
vaez's approach is comprehensive and multidimensional and de-
signed to address the four components of morality (Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). 
Hart's chapter, as noted above, addresses how and why some 
adolescents come to have relatively more moral elements in their 
identity. Hart is interested in how identity comes to be invested in 
moral lines of action through opportunities to join with others in the 
activity or to be called to the activity by others. His work suggests 
the importance of community service for developing adolescents. 
Finally, Staub's chapter focuses on raising caring and nonvio-
lent children but also includes reflections on significant societal-level 
moral needs and challenges. Staub has long been interested in pro-
moting active caring and helping, and he has helped create training 
programs for teachers, police, and others to reduce violence, racism, 
and the passivity of bystanders. He is also an expert on the roots of 
collective violence and genocide (Staub, 1989) and has spearheaded 
a project in Rwanda and worked with world leaders to promote heal-
ing, forgiveness, and reconciliation. His chapter finds echoes 
throughout the volume when he describes what we know about 
raising children to be "inclusively" caring, that is, children who care 
about all human beings. The theme of moral courage-going beyond 
the expected in the face of adversity-was important to all the con-
tributors and participants at the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Moti-
vation. 
In conclusion, this volume represents a set of chapters equally 
guided by respect for diverse theoretical perspectives, for experimen-
tal as well as observational and interview methodologies, and for 
traditional as well as innovative approaches for studying the phys-
iological, emotional, cognitive, and even spiritual sources of moral 
motivation and behavior. 
We hope that the integrations, analyses, and speculations offered 
here will be provocative and that they will inspire a renewed inter-
est in moral development theory and research as well as renewed 
optimism about their potential to be implemented at individual and 
collective levels of moral education. 
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